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Unlikely Allies: Hilda Neatby, Michel Foucault, and
the Critique of Progressive Education
James M. Pitsula
Hilda Neatby, the author of So Little for the Mind, which stirred up a national debate
about education in the 1950s, finds an unlikely ally in Michel Foucault.  Both believe that
progressive education, grounded in scientific pedagogy, is a means of domination rather
than liberation.  Both trace its roots to the 18th-century Age of Reason, which, according
to Foucault, gave birth to the “disciplinary society” and, in Neatby’s view, destabilized
the balance between faith and reason. Although they are philosophically far apart
(Foucault, a Nietzschean; Neatby, a Christian), they have a startlingly similar appraisal
of the progressive school.
Hilda Neatby, l’auteure de So Little for the Mind, qui a suscité un débat national au sujet
de l’éducation dans les années cinquante, trouve un allié inattendu en la personne de
Michel Foucault. Les deux croient que l’éducation progressive, fondée sur la pédagogie
scientifique, est un moyen de domination plutôt que de libération. Ils la font tous les
deux remonter au Siècle des lumières qui, selon Foucault, a donné naissance à la « société
disciplinaire » et, selon Neatby, a rompu l’équilibre entre la foi et la raison.  Bien que
qu’ils soient de deux écoles de pensée fort éloignées (Foucault, un nietzschéen, et Neatby,
une chrétienne), leur évaluation de l’éducation progressive est étrangement semblable.
––––––––––––––––
At first glance, the intellectual partnering of Hilda Neatby with Michel
Foucault seems improbable, if not perverse. At the time of his death in
1984, Foucault was one of the most famous intellectuals in the world. His
books, notably Madness and Civilization (1965), The Order of Things (1973),
Discipline and Punish (1979), and The History of Sexuality (1980), translated
into 16 languages, made an enormous impact on the work of scholars. His
influence continues to be felt in a wide range of disciplines — sociology,
history, psychology, philosophy, politics, linguistics, cultural studies,
literary theory, and education, to name a few. Hilda Neatby, on the other
hand, has a reputation confined mainly to Canada. Her chief claims to
fame were membership on the Massey Commission on the Arts, Letters
and Sciences (The  Repor t  o f  the  Roya l  Commiss ion  on  Nat iona l
Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, 1951) and authorship of So
Little for the Mind (Neatby, 1953), a polemic against progressive trends in
education that stirred up a controversy when it was published; it sold
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about 15,000 copies by 1975, the year Neatby died (Hayden, 1983, p. 34).
While Foucault’s fame continued to grow after his death, Neatby’s
reputation faded. Even in their professional and personal lives, the two
individuals could scarcely have been more different from one another.
Foucault was a distinguished member of the Collège de France, Neatby a
professor in the History Department at the University of Saskatchewan;
Foucault, a sexual adventurer who died of AIDS, Neatby a devout
Presbyterian spinster who expressed amazement at the sexual practices
mentioned in Mary McCarthy’s novel The Group (Hayden, 1983, p. 5).
Despite these disparities, there are startling convergences in their
thought. Both are skeptical about the claims of modernity and call into
question the allegedly “liberating,” “humanitarian,” and “democratizing”
benefits of the 18th-century Age of Reason. Both view progressive
education, based on the principles of psychology and scientific pedagogy,
as essentially an instrument of power and domination, rather than
emancipation and enlightenment. Foucault is content to trace the effects
of power and describe its operations; he makes no moral judgments because
he believes such statements are meaningless. He sees power and knowledge
as two sides of the same coin, inseparable from one another. There is no
such thing as disinterested knowledge that can be used to call power to
account. His critique of Western civilization is relentless and complete.
Neatby, by contrast, wants to save Western civilization from itself by
restoring a proper balance between reason and faith. She believes that we
have strayed from the true path and need to find our way back. For
Foucault, there never was a path; the categories of reason and faith are
artificial constructs that bear no relationship to truth.
Comparing Neatby and Foucault deepens our understanding of the
meaning of progressive education and throws new light on the place of So
Little for the Mind in the history of Canadian educational thought. Pigeon-
holed as a conservative, “back-to-the-basics” critic of new trends in
education, Neatby emerges as a thinker who anticipated certain post-
modernist themes and applied them to an analysis of the philosophy and
practice of education. Seen in this perspective, her thought acquires a depth
and sophistication that it has not always been accorded. So Little for the
Mind can be read as an extended commentary on the idea, later developed
in Foucault’s work, that what looks like progress in the social sciences and
pedagogy is really “an insidious new form of social control” (Miller, 1993,
p. 113).
Foucault (1979) presents a revisionist interpretation of the penal reforms
of the 18th and 19th centuries in Discipline and Punish, the book closest to
Neatby’s concerns. The banning of torture and public executions in favour
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of gentler punishments is usually interpreted as evidence of the
advancement of civilization, signifying a more humanitarian approach to
the treatment of criminals. Foucault calls attention to the displacement
that occurred in the object of the punitive operation — no longer the body,
but the soul. Punishment now acted “in depth on the heart, the thoughts,
the will, the inclinations” (Foucault, 1979, p. 16). It was “intended not to
punish the offence, but to supervise the individual, to neutralize his
dangerous state of mind, to alter his criminal tendencies . . .” (p. 18). The
punishment bore with it “an assessment of normality and a technical
prescription for a possible normalization” (p. 21). Moreover, “humane”
penal procedures became entangled with a new corpus of knowledge, a
science of penology, whose purpose was the “management of the depths
of the human soul” (Rose, 1990, p. 7).
Foucault extends the argument from the prison to other prison-like
institutions where discipline is administered: the insane asylum, barracks,
factory, and school. “The workshop, the school, the army were subject to a
whole micro-penality of time (lateness, absences, interruption of tasks), of
activity (inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of behavior (impoliteness,
disobedience), of speech (idle chatter, insolence), of the body (‘incorrect’
attitudes, irregular gestures, lack of cleanliness), of sexuality (impurity,
indecency)”  (Foucault, 1979, p. 178). Of central importance to the
disciplinary regime was the examination, a technique that combines
surveillance with normalizing judgment. The procedure became standard
practice in everything from psychiatry and the diagnosis of disease to the
hiring of labour. It made possible the science of pedagogy by placing school-
children in a “field of surveillance” and “engag[ing] them in a whole mass
of documents that capture and fix them” (p. 189). The individual is
transformed into a “case,” who may be “described, judged, measured,
compared with others” and who has to be “trained or corrected, classified,
normalized, excluded, etc.” (p. 191). Foucault asserts that these disciplinary
techniques created something new in human history. Previously, ordinary
individuality, “the everyday individuality of everybody . . . [had] remained
below the threshold of description.” Now “the threshold of describable
individuality” had been lowered, and this description was used as “a means
of control and a method of domination” (p. 191).
Foucault finds in the Panopticon , Jeremy Bentham’s 19th-century
architectural design for the ideal prison, an apt metaphor for the
disciplinary society:
. . . at the periphery, an annular building; at the center, a tower; this tower is pierced with
wide windows that open into the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided
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into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows,
one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside,
allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to
place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a
condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe
from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in the
cells of the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each
actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible. (Foucault, 1979, p. 200)
The inhabitant of the cell can be seen by the supervisor, but the side walls
prevent communication with other prisoners. The inmate does not know
whether he is being observed at any given moment, but he is always sure
that he may be so. The person who is constantly fixed in the gaze of the
supervisor begins to internalize the mechanism of power to which he is
subjected. He becomes his own jailer.
The Panopticon is also a laboratory. It can be used to carry out
experiments, modify behaviour, and correct undesirable attributes. Those
in the tower (metaphorically speaking) can experiment with medicines,
try out different punishments, employ various techniques, and conduct
research. “The Panopticon is a privileged place for experiments on men,
and for analyzing with complete certainty the transformations that may
be obtained from them” (Foucault, 1979, p. 204), the very model of the
human sciences. The Panopticon must be understood, not as a “dream
building,” but as “the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its
ideal form” (p. 205). It has diverse applications: reform of prisoners,
treatment of patients, instruction of schoolchildren, confinement of the
insane, supervision of workers, and rehabilitation of the unemployed. The
aim is not to repress, censor, or put down; it is to “strengthen the social
forces — to increase production, to develop the economy, spread education,
raise the level of public morality . . .” (p. 208).
Foucault (1979) suggests that the mechanisms of discipline extended
more widely in the modern period to the point that Western society was
penetrated through and through with disciplinary methods. The growth
in the number of institutions, such as prisons, asylums, and schools,
testified to this, as did the increase in the level of surveillance and
supervision beyond the walls of institutions. Schools were not content
to train docile children, but had also “to supervise the parents, to gain
information as to their way of life, their resources, their piety, their
morals” (Foucault, 1979, p. 211). The Panoptic gaze fixed on adults in
their own homes, detecting “whether they know their catechism and the
prayers, whether they are determined to root out the vices of their
children, how many beds there are in the house and what the sleeping
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arrangements are” (p. 211).
Foucault (1979) speaks of the emergence of a “disciplinary society” (p.
209), an “indefinitely generalizable mechanism of ‘panopticism’ ” (p. 216).
“Much more than architectural ingenuity, it was an event in the ‘history of
the human mind’ ” (p. 216). This conclusion leads him to a reinterpretation
of the Enlightenment. The 18th century saw the establishment of formally
egalitarian legal and political frameworks, embodying the concept of the
“rights of man,” expressed, for example, in the French Revolution and the
American Revolution. But, for Foucault, the development and extension
of disciplinary mechanisms constituted the dark side of the process,
establishing a regime that took away freedom, rather than extending it.
“The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that were
egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, everyday, physical
mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially non-
egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines. . . . The
‘Enlightenment,’ which discovered the liberties, also invented the
disciplines” (p. 222).
The word “discipline” is used here in two senses, referring both to
punishment and to an organized body of knowledge. Foucault contends
that that the two meanings cannot be separated from one another, that
they are two aspects of the same thing. Thus, the human sciences are heavily
implicated in the disciplinary society. “The formation of knowledge and
the increase of power regularly reinforce one another in a circular process”
(Foucault, 1979, p. 224). The power exercised over inmates in prisons,
patients in hospitals, pupils in schools, or workers in factories makes
possible the disciplines of clinical medicine, psychiatry, child psychology,
educational psychology, and personnel management. The knowledge
gained thereby is then applied to prisoners, patients, schoolchildren, and
workers to refine and multiply the effects of power, a process that in turn
leads to further advancements in the various fields of knowledge. The
end result is not more freedom, but an ever-more penetrating and pervasive
control over the human mind, body, and soul.
And, although the universal juridicism of modern society seems to fix limits on the exercise
of power, its universally widespread panopticism enables it to operate, on the underside
of the law, a machinery that is both immense and minute, which supports, reinforces,
multiplies the asymmetry of power and undermines the limits that are traced around the
law. (Foucault, 1979, p. 223)
From this perspective, the pre-Enlightenment, inhumane punishments
— beatings, torture, dismemberment of bodies, hangings — were less
invasive. They inflicted horrible pain on the body, but left the mind and
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soul alone. Modernity, the human sciences, and progress brought with
them the indefinite discipline of “interrogation without end,” “a file that
was never closed, the calculated leniency of a penalty that would be
interlaced with the ruthless curiosity of an examination, a procedure that
would be at the same time the permanent measure of a gap in relation to
an inaccessible norm . . .” (Foucault, 1979, p. 227). With respect to education,
the methods of the old-fashioned school — strapping, detention, forced
memorization, and relentless drill — at least were not presented as being
something they were not. Power relations were naked and obvious. As
Foucault points out, the educational psychology that was supposed to
correct the rigors of the traditional school does no such thing. “We must
not be misled,” he writes, “these techniques merely refer individuals from
one disciplinary authority to another, and they reproduce, in a concentrated
or formalized form, the scheme of power-knowledge proper to each
discipline . . .” (pp. 226–227).
Although Foucault gives little attention to the specifics of pedagogy
and schooling, other scholars have taken up the task of applying his ideas
to the education system. Indeed, the project has given rise to a minor
academic industry. A leading practitioner, Thomas Popkewitz, has written
and edited a small library of books devoted to elaborating the Foucaultian
idea that “particular systems of pedagogical ideas and rules of reasoning”
are “the effects of power in schools” (Popkewitz, 1998, p. 32; see also Ball,
1990; Popkewitz, 1991; Popkewitz, 1993; Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998;
Popkewitz & Fendler, 1999; Popkewitz, Franklin, & Pereyra, 2001). Much
of this material, not only that of Popkewitz but of others working in the
same vineyard, is so clogged with jargon that it is almost impossible to
read. With due diligence, however, the patient reader can extract bits of
information and detect the flow of the argument.
Of particular value for the purpose of this discussion is the application
of Foucault’s theories to early-20th-century discourse about childhood,
the state, and schooling. The pedagogical science of the day, influenced
greatly by the ideas of American philosopher/psychologist John Dewey,
aimed to create self-disciplined, self-motivated individuals capable of
participating effectively and co-operatively in democratic society.
Popkewitz (2001) maintains that these pedagogical discourses “connected
the scope and aspirations of public powers with the personal and subjective
capabilities of individuals” (p. 314). Social progress required the
development of a “New Man,” a new secular citizen who “would shed
the dispositions of religious and inherited social order and replace them
with a subjectivity [how one thinks, feels, and acts] that embodied the
obligations, responsibilities, and personal discipline embodied in liberal
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democratic ideals. The school was a central institution in this form of
governance” (p. 318). The state targeted the “self” as a “site of
administration” (p. 318), and the social sciences, especially psychology,
were enlisted to carry out the project by “giving focus to the micro-
processes by which individuals become self-motivated, self-responsible,
and ‘reasonable’” (p. 321). “Developmental and learning theories opened
the child’s behavior, attitudes, and beliefs to scrutiny, such that they could
be acted upon to effect cognition and affect” (p. 323). The key point is that
progressive schooling constituted a power relation — the social
administration of the soul.
Popkewitz draws a parallel between Dewey, who wanted to mould
children so that they were fit to live in a democracy, and Lev Vygotsky, a
Russian psychologist and contemporary of Dewey, who tried to devise a
pedagogy to instill in Soviet children the attitudes proper to a Communist
society. Dewey visited Russia in the 1920s at a time when many Soviet
intellectuals considered his philosophy of pragmatism (the notion that
assertions are to be evaluated by their practical consequences and bearing
on human interests) of some value in advancing the revolution (Popkewitz,
2001, pp. 315–316). The argument here is not that the Soviet Union is the
same as the United States, but rather that disciplinary mechanisms were
implicit in the pedagogies of both Dewey and Vygotsky. Both employed
psychological techniques to measure, classify, guide, direct, and control
the individual. Whether the exercise of power was good or bad is open for
debate, but in both cases power was deployed. The individual was viewed
as an object of “moral orthopaedics” (Foucault, 1979, p. 10) in need of
being normalized and made into a well-adjusted, productive unit of society.
Moreover, the power of progressive educators, whether of the American
or Soviet variety, was rooted in “objective” science and was, therefore, of
a totalizing nature that had a tendency to drive out alternative claims to
authority based on religion, tradition or parental wisdom. The child was
at the mercy of the educational experts; they knew best.
Hilda Neatby attacks this state of affairs with deft sarcasm and sharp
logic. “Progressive education in Canada,” she writes, “is not liberation; it
is indoctrination both intellectual and moral” (Neatby, 1953, p. 42). “Experts
talk constantly of training for leadership, but their whole system is one of
conditioning for servitude” (p. 236). In support of her bold assertion, she
cites chapter and verse from curriculum guides, programs of study, and
pronouncements of professional educators. She does a better job of applying
Foucault to progressive education than does Popkewitz, even though there
is no evidence that she read Foucault or had heard of him (Discipline and
Punish was first published in French the year she died.)
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A good deal of the commentary on So Little for the Mind focuses on
particular aspects of her critique: the failure to teach the three Rs; automatic
promotion of pupils from one grade to the next; inordinate attention given
to extra-curricular activities; lack of liberal learning among professional
educators; the breakdown of discipline in the classroom; time-wasting
activities in teacher-training colleges. Commentators tend to shy away
from her main and seemingly most outrageous charge: progressive schools
are totalitarian in nature; they condition students for servitude. She means
what she says, and Foucault helps her make her case.
Neatby objects strongly to the unconcealed ambition of the progressive
school to intervene in all aspects of the life of the child. This tendency was
an outgrowth of Dewey’s pronouncement: “education as life and as
growth” (Neatby, 1953, p. 55), and the “whole child goes to school” (p. 8).
Neatby agrees that, of course, “education is life,” but that doesn’t mean
the school should do everything. She worries that parents are shoved aside
or treated in a patronizing manner. School officials in pursuit of information
intrude upon the privacy of the family. The role of parents, it would seem,
is “to produce the child, provide him with food, clothing and shelter, and
then furnish the guidance officer, voluntarily or involuntarily, with such
information as he needs for making his decision” (p. 211).
Neatby quotes with dismay from the British Columbia Programme of
Studies for Junior High Schools, 1948:
When difficulties arise it is the underlying cause that should be discovered and treated
rather than the outward symptoms. In other words, the treatment should fit the pupil
and not his act alone. The same misdemeanour may have an entirely different significance
when committed by two different persons. This is why it is so futile to adopt fixed rules
for dealing with specific faults. Successful treatment depends upon thorough knowledge
of the case. Teachers should derive a lesson from established clinical practice and make
a thorough study of the pupil, his background and history, before deciding upon any
course of treatment. In the more difficult cases this will mean studying the home conditions
and consulting the parents and others in the school and outside it who have knowledge
of the pupil which might prove important. Ordinarily it is the part of wisdom to postpone
conference with the pupil until . . . there has been time for careful consideration of the
available facts and a reasoned decision as to the most promising kind of treatment. Careful
notes should be kept of all the data secured and also of the course of treatment and its
results. (Neatby, 1953, pp. 211–212)
This is what Foucault labels the “penitentiary” approach, a method that
substitutes for the convicted offender, the “delinquent” (Miller, 1993, p.
230). It is not so much the delinquent’s act as his or her life that is subject
to discipline and correction. The point of concern is not the offence as
such, but rather the deviation of a personality from the norm. Foucault
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contends that over the course of the 19th century prisons transformed
punitive procedures into a “penitentiary technique,” which then “haunted
the school, the court, the asylum” as well as the prison (Foucault, 1979, p.
299). Neatby has an intuitive understanding of the process, for immediately
following the long passage quoted above, she writes,
The procedure is undoubtedly appropriate for the inmate of a lunatic asylum or a specially
organized penal institution. In a school, however, where the children are given the freedom
properly accorded to rational individuals, justice demands that each one be equally
responsible for his overt acts and that from each be exacted approximately equal penalties,
if penalties are needed. (Neatby, 1953, p. 212)
The importation of the penitentiary technique into the school offends her
sense of respect for children as moral beings with minds of their own.
Another aspect of the totalizing agenda of the progressive school that
Neatby abhors is the effort to teach children correct “attitudes.” They are
subjected to relentless pressure to accept the approved values of
“democracy,” “social living,” or “effective living.” The “social attitudes”
to be “constantly nurtured,” states the Saskatchewan Programme of Studies
for the High School, 1950, are “cooperation and social concern; spirituality;
honesty and integrity; appreciation of . . . the finer aspects of life” (cited in
Neatby, 1953, p. 49, truncation in original). Teachers are not so much
teaching English literature, natural science, or history as they are
“condition[ing] little boys and girls so that they will grow up to be orderly,
well-adjusted, but progressive and forward-looking citizens . . .” (p. 119).
The teacher arranges the facts so that they lead to the politically correct
result. Neatby cites the Ontario high school curriculum guide for world
geography, which requires pupils to gain “a sympathetic understanding
of other peoples,” and then she asks, “Are the teachers to tell them nothing
that might detract from this sympathy?” (Neatby, 1953, p. 167) The Ontario
social studies course (grades 7 to 10), a mishmash of anthropology,
sociology, economics, and history, has as one of its chief aims to show that
democracy is the crowning achievement of civilization. Neatby remarks
that such a mangled approach to history does no real good to the cause of
democracy. “If all that is desired is to say that democracy is good and
absolute rule is bad, why not just say so in winning tones, and leave the
history out? After all, in spite of generous assumptions, history offers no
logical proof of anything . . .” (p. 168). She defends the right of the teacher
to teach without being told what the students are expected to believe at
the end of the course (p. 171).
Dewey recommends that students participate in group projects, the
better to absorb the spirit of democracy and co-operative endeavour. He
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puts forward the principle that children learn best when they solve a
problem of their own devising and when the project involves manual
activity (Neatby, 1953, p. 172). While the teacher may inspire the project,
the children must accept it as “theirs.” The Quebec Handbook for Teachers,
1951, advises, “The skillful teacher will set the stage as it were, in such a
way that the pupils will accept the purposes and aims as their own” (cited
in Neatby, 1953). “In short,” Neatby observes, “their aims better look a lot
like the teacher’s” (p. 182), or in the words of “a perceptive child who had
been exposed to the ‘newer school practices’: ‘Cooperation means you
gotta’ ”(p. 183). Neatby considers the manipulation and trickery practised
in the progressive classroom an insult to the intelligence of the students.
Dictatorship masquerades under the cloak of democracy, giving the latter
a bad name.
She makes the same point about the progressive injunction that the
teacher must constantly attend to the pupils’ motivation, and at all costs
refrain from forcing them to learn material they are not interested in. Dewey
assumes that children are naturally curious about subject matter that is
directly relevant to their day-to-day lives, but that abstract knowledge or
information remote from their immediate environment is of much less
interest or value to them. Thus, teachers are expected to employ various
stratagems to awaken curiosity by showing pupils how school lessons
relate to life outside the classroom. The Saskatchewan Elementary School
Curriculum, 1945, suggests that the study of electricity should arise out of
a “situation,” such as the burning out of a fuse plug. Neatby (1953) writes:
It would not do merely to ask, “What is known about the nature of electricity? How it is
produced and transmitted?” That would not “interest” Grade VII and VIII pupils. Instead
the teacher must begin by surreptitiously shorting a circuit so as to blow out a fuse, and
then exclaim: “Well, well, isn’t that interesting? A fuse has blown! Doesn’t it make you
want to study electricity? Wouldn’t you like to learn all about it, so that we can produce
a play about the life of Edison?” What would happen if the pupils were honest and
courageous enough to say, “No, not particularly,” we are not told. (p. 193)
Neatby is repelled by the phoniness, the insincerity, and the attempt to
conceal the exercise of power. Moreover, she is sure that students are canny
enough to see through the elaborate ruses. The traditionalist teacher who
required pupils to learn something and rebuked or punished them when
they failed to do so, “showed a truer respect for them than those who
regard them only as inert wax to be moulded with patience and skill”
(Neatby, 1953, p. 201). The whole point of the modern school, as far as
Neatby can see, is to assure that children do what they want to do or want
to do what they are doing — the perfect image of a suffocating totalitarian
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regime (p. 203). Neatby distrusts the progressives’ repudiation of externally
imposed discipline because she regards the alternative — contrived
spontaneity and socially engineered conformity — as fraudulent and
dangerous. Slick human relations management practised on the young is,
in her opinion, a far more serious threat to democracy than the old-
fashioned system of rules and punishments.
The progressive school insists that pupils feel good about themselves
and that they never fail or fall short of meeting an absolute standard. The
goal is to make school life as pleasant as possible, which, according to
Neatby, leads to a uniformly low standard, easily obtainable by almost all.
Progressive educators promote the lie that all children are equal, or almost
equal, in ability. Democracy demands that this be true. Neatby states that
children know full well that their capacities are not the same “and, if they
were not so indifferent, would doubtless be highly diverted at this elaborate
adult conspiracy to conceal the facts of life” (Neatby, 1953, p. 332).
And what of the children who fail to absorb the correct democratic and
co-operative attitudes, the ones who are incompletely socialized? The
Saskatchewan Elementary School Curriculum Guide, 1952, recommends
that the teacher keep a record of the pupil’s progress.
Anecdotal notes are possibly the most reliable. The teacher observes the behavior of the
students in the classroom, on the playground, and in places away from the school. She
records behavior incidents which she believes are indicative of the pupils’ attitudes,
interests, and appreciations. These anecdotes are collected from time to time, and are
usually written into the cumulative record of the students. From these notes the teacher
makes estimates of progress. (cited in Neatby, 1953, p. 221)
Here we have, Neatby says, “the vision of the coming police state.” The
Panopticon comes to the playground. She avows that no self-respecting
teacher would consent to this type of surveillance of his or her pupils.
Those who do might as well “hire out their work to an eager little band of
spies and agents provocateurs” (p. 221).
Neatby’s accuses educational experts of having “magnified . . . [their]
office” (Neatby, 1953, p. 55) to the point where they become totalitarian in
their approach to schooling. The remedy is for schools and teachers to
“back off,” to give up their mission of socializing the whole child, and to
try to do one thing really well: feed the child’s mind. This would open up
some space, give the pupil relief from the unrelenting gaze of the school,
and make room for the home, church, and other organizations to exercise
influence over the child’s development. Neatby does not consider the
possibility that these agencies, too, can be taken over by social-science-
driven disciplinary mechanisms. This is Foucault’s nightmare — there is
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no escaping Panopticisim. Neatby’s vision is not as dark.
She holds that intellectual training is liberating in a way that “socializing”
is not. The child who learns the basic skills of reading and writing is
empowered; he has more freedom than the one trapped in illiteracy or
semi-literacy. Progressive educators continually make excuses as to why,
after 12 years, a high school graduate cannot write a sentence, much less a
paragraph. It is impossible to teach such skills, they say, because now
everybody goes to school, not just the elite as in the old days. Or it is not
important because grammar and spelling are overrated as “life skills.” Or
it is actually being done; the evidence to the contrary is anecdotal or based
on shoddy research. Neatby’s point is that schools might do a better job of
the three Rs if they stopped trying to do everything and focused on giving
pupils the basic tools required for self-education.
Secondly, she asks that children be expected to master a well-defined
and systematically organized body of knowledge — the despised “facts.”
She rejects what she calls the false antithesis between learning facts and
thinking about them, between content and process. How can a child think
without facts to think about? One might as well say, she writes, “The
important thing is not to consume food, but to digest it” (Neatby, 1953,
pp. 44–45). Facts, even those learned by memory work or the rote method,
provide material for thought and a starting point for critical thinking.
Moreover, the mastery of a field of knowledge is intrinsically empowering.
It gives students the confidence that they know something and that they
have the ability to refute statements, if only inwardly, they know to be
false. They have a foundation for standing up to the teacher, who must
bow to the facts, if only in the child’s mind. When the facts are disdained
and replaced with vague understandings, cloudy generalities, and correct
“attitudes,” the teacher must always be right.
Neatby states repeatedly that the progressive educator’s fascination with
process at the expense of content does children a terrible disservice by
depriving them of a rich, full, and intellectually rewarding curriculum.
They are cut off from “any real enjoyment or understanding of the
inheritance of western civilization” (Neatby, 1953, p. 16). “The material
which would enable the individual to work out his salvation [what Foucault
would call alternative discourses, ‘the best of our civilization in literature,
science, history, art’] is practically withheld in order that he may be made
more receptive to the ready-made solutions that are handed out” (p. 59).
Neatby demands that the teacher not have exclusive control over the flow
of information and not pre-select the facts so that they lead to the right
conclusion, however laudable it might be (“democracy,” “tolerance,” “the
importance of sharing”). The central purpose of formal education is “to
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dispel the ignorance that leaves one helpless” and “to train the mind for
control and power” (Neatby, 1954b, p. 12). By giving students access to
the intellectual and cultural heritage of Western civilization, obliging them
to master a coherent body of knowledge, and making sure that they can
obtain meaning from the printed page and express themselves clearly and
effectively, the teacher confers power on the student. Education is liberation,
not therapy. Education interpreted as conditioning leaves the young “weak
from lack of nourishment and blind from want of vision” (Neatby, 1953,
p. 125).
Neatby offers one other suggestion to promote the power and freedom
of the individual — the curtailment of Dewey’s cherished group work
and shared activities. Some group activity is fine, but it should be kept
within strict bounds. “In the enthusiasm for joint activity, how easy it is to
forget that thinking, if it is done at all, must be done alone! All real mental
training is an individual process. There is common ground on which
rational minds can meet, but each must find its own path there” (Neatby,
1983, p. 234). She admires those individuals, who without denying their
membership in society, stand alone — “the genius, the martyr, or perhaps
just the eccentric or the crank” — all those who endure solitude “in order
to witness to what they thought they saw” (Neatby, 1954b, p. 47).
In the last chapter of So Little for the Mind, Neatby asks the question:
Why and how did the sorry state of affairs embodied in the progressive
school come to pass? She knows it is not all John Dewey’s fault. He is but
a symptom of a deeper ailment. Like Foucault, she locates the root of the
problem in the 18th-century Enlightenment. Foucault argues that the
supposedly humane and progressive character of the Age of Reason
masked a dark side that gave rise to the “disciplinary society.” Neatby
posits that the Enlightenment’s too-exclusive “worship of reason”
produced disastrous consequences. “As a result,” she writes, “in the
twentieth century some two hundred years after the ‘enlightenment’ we
encounter the new barbarism” (Neatby, 1953, p. 316). “What is needed is a
renewal of faith and a renunciation of the false rationalism which implicitly
denies the power of faith for good or evil in human society” (p. 324). This
statement correlates with her repeated insistence that one of the main
purposes of education is to bring students into contact with the heritage
of Western civilization, which she describes as a product of Judaic morality,
Christian love, Greek philosophy, Roman law, and modern humanism.
The problem is that undue emphasis has been placed on the last term in
the list. Modern humanism, taken by itself, is not liberating; the unfettered
human sciences lead not to freedom, but to enslavement.
On this point, she is in agreement with Foucault, but then they part
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company. Foucault merely describes and dissects power relations; he makes
no comment as to whether the exercise of power in any particular case is
good, bad, or indifferent. His presentation of the Panopticon as a metaphor
for the disciplinary society is brilliant, but his philosophy, which is
essentially Nietzchean, does not permit him to criticize it on rational
grounds. He does not think there is any such thing as reason and truth in
any fixed, absolute sense. Nor does he think, for that matter, that there is
any such thing as “humanity” in any fixed, absolute sense. In his conclusion
to The Order of Things he predicts that the normative ideal of “man” will
soon be “effaced,” “like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea”
(Foucault, 1973, p. 387). His rejection of the foundations of Western
civilization is complete and profound. It is almost comical to see
educational experts attempting to extract some kind of progressive lesson
from Foucault. Apparently they do not understand how subversive he is.
As far as Foucault is concerned, those who are subordinated or oppressed
may deploy power against the power being exercised upon them, but they
have no good or rational basis either to do so or not to do so.
This is very far from the intellectual world of Hilda Neatby. She affirms
the worth of Western civilization taken as a whole and seeks to rescue it
from the distortion that has occurred because of the importance given to
one aspect of it. It seems doubtful that she can make her case on rational
grounds alone. In a letter to Frank Underhill written shortly after the
publication of So Little For the Mind, she said that she thought she could,
but that “it seemed to me insincere to write seriously about the most serious
of subjects without making clear my own convictions. At the same time I
was most anxious to make a purely rational case” (Hayden, 1983, p. 34).
She may have been anxious to, but she did not. In her other essays, it is
evident that as soon as the argument “hits the wall,” that is, each time she
comes to define the irreducible essence of education, she invokes the
transcendental. In “The Group and the Herd,” she borrows Matthew
Arnold’s formulation that the social motive for education is “to make
reason and the will of God prevail” (Neatby, 1954b, p. 41). In The Debt of
Our Reason , she quotes Sir Thomas Browne to the effect that man in
exploring the wonders of the world is “paying the ‘Debt of our Reason we
owe unto God, the homage we pay for not being Beasts’” (Neatby, 1954a,
p. 3). The God she is talking about is not necessarily the Christian God.
She allows some latitude on this point, averring that it is difficult to conceive
of humanity in other than a degraded state “apart from reason . . .; or even
apart from the will of God if only in the sense of the power of the mystery
of human destiny” (Neatby, 1954b, p. 46). It is her conviction that if God is
dead, so is man.
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She defines education in one passage as “the discovery that the world
is more interesting than oneself,” (Neatby, 1953, p. 232) and elsewhere as
“the gaining of a humble conception of the greatness of human nature and
human society, and of the vastness and complexity of the universe in which
its place is set. . . . It is learning the love of, and the pursuit of, perfection”
(Neatby, 1954b, p. 37–38). Neatby displays an unmistakable reverence for
knowledge that cannot be dissociated from reverence for God and His
creation. She says that a teacher needs only two things: to love his subject
and to love his students. All the rest will follow. This explains her criticism
of Dewey’s narrow understanding of self-realization. The beginning of
wisdom and freedom is to realize that the world is more interesting than
you are, and to submit humbly to the greatness of God. The teacher is
privileged to lead students “into the company of the great in history, in
literature, and the arts; and into the mystery and the beauty of the world
in which they live. Self-realization comes most surely by losing oneself for
a time in the contemplation of something greater than and beyond oneself”
(p. 25).
Neatby makes it clear that humility must not be confused with servility,
docility, or passivity. Life is arduous, a struggle, nothing comes easily, and
intellectual attainment is hard won. It demands “the intellectual equivalents
of worship and dedication, the complete and disinterested devotion to an
exacting discipline” (Neatby, 1954a, p. 21). This is one of her main objections
to progressive education, which is too easy, too soft, too accommodating,
allowing neither confrontation with failure nor challenge to greatness.
“Happiness,” she writes in one of her most revealing passages, “is a by-
product of effort and achievement. The purest happiness may be quite
inseparable from pain” (Neatby, 1954b, p. 24). But at least pain is real. She
writes to her sister that “Christianity is not very comfortable. It creates as
many problems as it solves, but it has that quality of being alive which it is
impossible to help associating with the truth” (Hayden, 1983, p. 20).
Hayden (1983) observes that it is too early to make a judgment about
the originality of Neatby’s ideas because the intellectual history of her
generation has not been written (p. 320). Dewar (1990) argues that her
views were “not unusual in university circles of the post-war era” (p. 37).
Ross’s (1989) doctoral dissertation places her writings in the context of
educational debates occurring in the United States in the 1950s, as well as
in the context of the conservative philosophical tradition in Canada. He
suggests that her contribution was a “major re-statement” of the
conservative position (p. 251), a statement executed with enough panache
to spark a vigorous, though short-lived, national debate. This assessment
understates Neatby’s achievement. Although it would be going too far to
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say that she anticipates post-modernism in its entirety and delivers a pre-
emptive strike, her work displays an acute understanding of what Foucault
(1979) calls “the disciplinary society” (Foucault, p. 209). She criticizes the
social sciences, especially psychology, at a time when most of her
contemporaries in academia were uncritical enthusiasts (see Owram, 1986).
Her openly expressed religious faith, far from being a quirky “add-on”
detracting from her reputation as a rigorous intellectual, is revealed as
integral to her argument. She understood better that did most Canadian
academics the gravity of the attack on Western civilization, and she
mounted a vigorous, thorough defence.
Neatby’s depiction of the product of the progressive school — “morally
flabby, intellectually cloudy, and creatively sterile” (Neatby, 1953, p. 131)
— bears a passing resemblance to Nietzsche’s “last man.” In Thus Spoke
Zarathustra the philosopher wrote: “‘What is love? What is creation? What
is longing? What is a star?’ thus asks the last man, and he blinks” (Nietzsche,
1966, p. 17). Nietzsche turns his back on Western philosophy and
Christianity, which he blames for enshrining a moral code fit only for slaves.
To “become what one is” under such circumstances was no easy task. It
necessitates a “will to power,” a rediscovery of the chaos, violence, and
cruelty buried within oneself. Nietzsche’s “new man” or “super-man” is a
creature of destructive creativity, a figure beyond good and evil,
“uninhibited by the yearning of ordinary mortals for happiness, justice or
pity” (Miller, 1993, p. 174).
Biographer James Miller (1993) portrays Michel Foucault as a man
deeply under the influence of Nietzsche. The philosopher both provided
intellectual inspiration and gave direction to Foucault’s personal life, one
that was consumed by the search for the Nietzschean “limit-experience”
(p. 117). Miller gives an account of Foucault’s fascination with the ecstatic
mingling of pain and pleasure, his obsession with the sado-masochistic
eroticism of the San Francisco leather scene of the 1970s and early 1980s,
his deliberate flouting of AIDS warnings, and, finally, his death from the
disease in 1984. Miller discovers something strangely heroic in what he
calls Foucault’s Nietzschean quest. He summarizes the “ethical point of
view” of Foucault’s (1965) first major book, Madness and Civilization, as
holding that “it is not immoral to be convulsed by singular fantasies and
wild impulses: such limit-experiences are to be valued as a way of winning
back access to the occluded, Dionysian dimension of being human” (p.
117). According to Miller, Foucault lived out what he wrote, heeding
Nietzsche’s invocation of primal energies as the only means by which man
can transcend himself and “give birth to a dancing star” (p. 70).
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Hilda Neatby, by comparison, seems to belong to a totally different
world: prim and proper, naïve, living a sheltered, provincial life, restricted
in her intellectual range, author of a minor book criticizing progressive
trends in education. And yet the history professor at the University of
Saskatchewan wrote a book about education that is grounded in
contemplation of the fate of Western civilization, the relationship between
faith and reason, the nature of humans, and the meaning of life. Her insights
into the defects of progressive education run parallel to those of Foucault
and are equally profound. A passage from So Little for the Mind brings
one up short. Progressive educators, she writes, “have got out of the
traditionalist rut, perhaps, but only to jog around a mysterious pragmatic
circle, their eyes fixed on the mud beneath their feet because it is a real
situation. The stars still shine over their heads but stars are under suspicion;
there is about them more than a touch of the transcendental” (Neatby,
1953, p. 131).
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